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Peter D. Swan* Critical Legal Theory and
The Politics of Pragmatism
Those who think that all paradigms must be left behind, so that we can
emerge in the light of an anarchistic post-modernity critique of Reason
.... With this total critique of Reason, one bids farewell not only to
Descartes but to his virtues as that egalitarianism of scientific thought
which renounces any privileged up by instrumental reason assumes
totalitarian traits itself. However, there is a moment of truth to this, and it
can only be to the good that there is today a heightened sensibility to the
Dialectic of Enlightenment, and thus to the fact that even a limited
enlightenment must enlighten itself.
- Jurgen Habermas
I. Introduction
In this century mainstream legal scholarship in the United States has been
subjected to various "crises of confidence" over the nature of the
adjudication process. One of the key features of more traditional legal
scholarship has been a belief in legal texts such as the constitution,
statutes and precedents which are said to possess discrete and objective
meaning capable of being discovered by objective detached observers.
This belief in the authority of the text has been most clearly expressed in
American constitutional law scholarship which has been dominated until
recently by the quest to reveal the public moral values that are said to
inhere in the body of the constitutional document itself. With the insights
of the Legal Realists into the subjective preferences of legal actors, the
foundations of this belief were severely shaken.1 Much of the last fifty
years has been spent trying to shore up the belief in the objective meaning
of social norms derived from legal texts.
In an effort to rebuild the crumbling edifice of adjudication, many legal
theorists have sought to appropriate the lessons of other scholarly
disciplines. Initially social sciences such as sociology and psychology and
more recently economics have been subject to instrumental examination
in the hope of breathing new life into a nearly moribund formalism. As
in many contemporary disciplines, in the 1980's the focus of efforts
towards a theoretical resuscitation in law, has switched to the study of the
centrality of the problem of language and meaning. In an attempt to
*Peter D. Swan, Department of Law, Carleton University, Ottawa.
**The author would like to thank Leon Trakman for his comments on an earlier draft.
1. See E. Mensch, "The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, 1920 to Present", in D. Kairys,
ed. The Politics of Law (1982).
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understand the nature and meaning of social norms which may be
derived from legal texts, legal theorists have turned toward the
interpretation of the activity of judges and thus to the questioning of the
relationships between judges and the texts which they interpret.
Recent law review articles make frequent reference to Anglo-
American philosophers such as Richard Rorty and John Searle, to
continental thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Hans Georg Gadamer or
Jurgen Habermas, and to literary theorists such as Stanley Fish or E. D.
Hirsch.2 Within the above group of thinkers, there is nothing approaching
a consensus on questions or meaning and language. It should thus come
as no surprise that the "turn to interpretation" in legal theory has also
incorporated many of the current philosophical debates along with the
appropriation of the methodology of deconstruction, hermeneutics, or
"critical theory". Rather than revealing the presence of shared objective
social values in legal material the resulting debate on legal interpretation
has raised the spectre of nihilism in which there is a sense that our shared
standards of reason for evaluating competing interpretations are
dissolving and that without such rational standards many of our
democratic ideals will be undermined.3
In this debate over objectivity in interpretation, the key question
centres on the claims to rationality that are attached to certain critical
standards of judgment. With this question, the debate on interpretation in
law begins to converge with the extensive debate on the nature of
rationality that is taking place in contemporary philosophy. Using the
recent work of Richard Bernstein 4 as an analytic framework, in the first
section of this paper, I will suggest that the characterization of
contemporary philosophical debate as one between the adherents of
objectivism and relativism may be equally applicable to recent debates
between liberal legal thinkers such as Ronald Dworkin and Owen Fiss
and the radical members of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies
(CLS). The second section of the paper will focus on the attempt to go
beyond dichotomous thinking to avoid the problems associated with
objectivism and relativism in the more recent critical legal theory of
Joseph Singer.5 While agreeing with the general aims of Singer's theory
2. S. Levinson, "Dworkin, Kennedy and Ely: Decoding the Legal Past" (1984), 51 Partisan
Rev. 248.
3. 0. Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation" (1982), 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739, at 740-1.
4. See especially R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism andRelativism (1983).
5. J. Singer, "The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory" (1984), 94 Yales L.J.1.
Singer's article represents one of the best examples of legal scholarship to have emerged from
the second generation of CLS writers. Not only does it very effectively clarify the nature of the
CLS critique but it also elaborates on the CLS project by developing a self-consciously critical
framework which takes into account many of the major theoretical developments in
contemporary philosophy and social theory.
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I will suggest that his disavowal of any rational standards for evaluating
competing positions undermiiies the normative basis of his own project
for developing a more pragmatic legal theory. In the final sections of the
paper I will briefly outline an alternative conception of pragmatism
which may be used to establish a more stable framework for critical legal
thought.
II. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism in Philosophy and Law
One of the most insightful examinations of the current state of affairs in
philosophy is found in the recent work of Richard J. Bernstein.
Bernstein's work is particularly suited to this task because of his
knowledge of both Anglo-American and continental philosophy. He
locates the key problematic in contemporary philosophy in the
opposition between objectivism and relativism. Defined very broadly by
Bernstein, objectivism refers to "the basic conviction that there is or must
be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge,
truth, reality, goodness or rightness."'6 Objectivism includes, various
forms of foundationalism which seek to establish objectivity and the
validation of norms at the price of ahistoricism and the possibility of an
unreflective dogmatism. At the other pole stands relativism, which
defines itself against objectivism in maintaining the impossibility of the
discovery of any ahistorical matrix. By concentrating on the historical
and preconceptual dimensions of human thought, relativism denies that
there can be something properly labelled "the standard of rationality
while insisting that there must be a plurality of standards of rationality
which remain "radically incommensurable. ' 7 With this lack of emphasis
on the justification of either epistemological or ethical norms comes a
perceived danger of a nihilism in which "anything is permitted."
Bernstein presents the dichotomy between objectivism and relativism
as a helpful way of making sense of recent philosophical conflicts. A
prevalent concern which Bernstein terms the "Cartesian Anxiety", helps
us to conceptualize this opposition. Bernstein presents Descartes'
philosophy as representative of the search for a foundation or fixed point
that provides security against change. For Descartes, the alternative to
such a fixed point is the chaos where nothing is fixed. According to
Bernstein, Descartes' position suggests the inevitability of the grand
Either/Or which had dominated recent philosophical debate. "Either
there is some ultimate support for our being, a fixed foundation for our
6. Bernstein, supra, note 4 at 8.
7. Bernstein, supra, note 4 at 8.
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knowledge, or we can not escape the forces of darkness that envelop us
with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.' 8
Bernstein refuses to take sides in this conflict. Indeed he suggests that
the dichotomy is "misleading and distortive" and must be overcome.9 He
insists that we are not reduced to this grand Either/Or but rather can still
find a way to make political and moral commitments without either
searching for new foundations for knowledge or resorting to a form of
relativism based on values which are entirely contextual or contingent.
Drawing on resources from various discourses, Bernstein elaborates on
an intellectual project aimed at illuminating a pragmatic concept of
rationality which provides a normative basis for evaluating or justifying
the legitimacy of specific traditions or modes of thought. Bernstein's
insistence on the communitarian character of all systems of rationality
allows him to consider the legitimacy of the constraints imposed by a
given tradition. Despite this concern for the legitimacy or justifications of
specific traditions, Bernstein does not fall back into the trap of
objectivism. Against those theorists who appeal to traditions (Gadamer)
or to given social practices (Rorty) as sources of moral judgments, he
maintains that it is important to emphasize "the role of domination in
distorting the process of intersubjective standards of judgment within any
given community of inquirers". 10 Accordingly, in his project it is
impossible to separate the recognition of the immanent character of the
rationality within a community from a critique of the power relations in
that community. Philosophy and politics remain intimately connected
within a radical and pragmatic concept of rationality.
Many of the questions which are at issue within contemporary
discussions in philosophy recur in recent debates over the role of
interpretation in law. Bernstein's characterization of the poles of
objectivism and relativism may also be applied in an analysis of the
contesting positions on the existence or non-existence of neutral standards
of rationality in adjudication." The "objectivist" forces in the current
debate over the nature of legal interpretation are most clearly represented
by Owen Fiss and Ronald Dworkin who insist on the need to ground
8. Bernstein, supra, note 4 at 18.
9. Bernstein, supra, note 4 at 19.
10. Bernstein, supra, note 4 at 181-196. In his insistence on the importance of domination,
Bernstein draws on the work of Jurgen Habermas.
11. Bernstein's theory has also been used as a framework for analyzing the interpretive debates
in legal theory by Dennis Patterson. See D. N. Patterson, "Interpretation in Law: Toward a
Reconstruction of the Current Debate" (1984), 29 Vill. L. Rev. 209. Patterson's use of
Bernstein's categories is highly schematic and instead of utilizing the latter's radical form of
pragmatism, he suggests that the "Cartesian Anxiety" can be overcome through a resort to the
later works of Wittgenstein.
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legal reasoning on a rational foundation. The relativist camp is
represented by more "radical" legal thinkers such as the "irrationalists"
among members of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies (CLS), who
suggest that rational standards are irrelevant because they view all
interpretive battles as questions of power.
In order to exorcise the spectre of the new nihilism which is thought
to arise from the thought of the latter legal thinkers, Fiss and Dworkin
contend that there must be rational standards with a validity independent
of individual moral choice from which we can derive legal rules. Rather
than attempt to resolve the danger of nihilism by referring to some
ahistorical moral criteria, Fiss and Dworkin appeal to the institutionali-
zation of communitarian standards of shared meaning.
Fiss locates an objective standard for adjudication in the "authority of
the legal community".' 2 While acknowledging that the true meaning of
legal values can only be articulated in an act of interpretation, he
maintains that the interpreter is not free to fashion meaning as she may
wish but is constrained to accept a highly circumscribed range of
interpretations. For Fiss constraint is expressed primarily in the
established practices and the authoritative rules of the legal community as
the relevant "interpretive community".' 3 The authoritative rules of the
community by constraining the interpreter thus transform interpretation
into an "objective" process and provide the criteria for its evaluation.
Ronald Dworkin's work on adjudication is even more elaborate than
that of Fiss. In his earlier works, Dworkin was committed to the
proposition that judges must seek and give the "right answer" to legal
questions without any element of discretion or choice. According to this
position, any coherent theory of adjudication had to include an appeal to
a background theory of political morality as a "complex set of principles
and policies that justify that scheme of government."' 4 Thus political and
ethical principles are said to represent a significant aspect of all law, since
they stand behind legal rules and provide the basis for their justification. 5
According to Dworkin, certain constellations of these principles guide
judges in resolving disputes between competing legal rules and are
regarded as binding because they form "part of the soundest theory of
law."16 This view presupposes the existence of some higher order
principle that is capable of determining the weight to be assigned not only
12. Supra, note 3 at 744.
13. Supra, note 3 at 744.
14. R. Dworkin, (1977) TakingRights Seriously 107.
15. Id, at 67.
16. Supra, note 14 at 67.
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to competing rules, but also to competing principles. 17 For Dworkin this
grounding of adjudication in the "soundest theory of law" prevents the
political nature of judging from generating into an ideological struggle
between conflicting principles.
With the recent publication of Law's Empire,18 Dworkin attributes an
even greater importance to the interpretive process in adjudication. Since
law is regarded as an interpretive concept, Dworkin concludes that all
attempts to formulate a relevant contemporary jurisprudence must be
founded on some conception of the nature of interpretation. For
Dworkin the best interpretation of legal practice is provided by his theory
of "law as integrity."' 9 Integrity, as "consistency in principle"20 acts as
normative ideal which is necessary for the legitimation of both the legal
and political system. Law as integrity requires an interpretation which is
consistent with the perpetuation of a particular ethical and legal tradition.
It thus aims to provide for the best possible interpretation of specific legal
practices and of the legal system as a whole.2 ' According to Dworkin,
only law as integrity can provide an objective standard for interpretation
which will allow us to escape the evils of positivism or of the pragmatic
nihilism of the Realists and the radical scholars associated with the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies.
The most prominent representatives of relativism in the contemporary
debate over the nature of legal interpretation are the so-called
irrationalists in the Conference on Critical Legal Studies.22 For the CLS
irrationalists there can be neither an objective rational conceptual
foundation for legal decisions nor any claim to a shared reason within a
given tradition or community: law is little more than politics by another
name. Accordingly, legal decisions are simply the judicial expression of
the wider ideological struggles of society as a whole and legal questions
are resolved through the use of power.
17. See A. Altman, "Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies and Dworkin" (1986), 15 Phil &
Pub. Aff. 205 at 217.
18. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
19. Id, at 94.
20. Id, at 161.
21. Id, at 245.
22. The major figure in the CLS irrationalists is Duncan Kennedy whose influence is
persuasive among a second generation of CLS scholars. For a discussion of the irrationalist
position see D. Kennedy and P. Gabel "Roll over Beethoven" (1984), 36 Stan. L. Rev.l. A
more appropriate label for the irrationalists may be based on either modem post-Marxist and
post-structuralist social theory and literary criticism. This tendency within CLS also exhibits
various degrees of commitment to irrationalism. CLS has readily accepted the label irrationalist
as a characterization of their position, and have in some cases adopted it. It is not meant in this
paper pejoratively. While the irrationalist group is not the only tendency in CLS, it is the most
influential.
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The CLS critique addresses itself to the political determination of legal
language and texts. Yet the politics of legal reasoning is not in itself
regarded as a problem. According to most CLS analysis, it is not politics,
but the effort to hide politics which is at issue: "the crime is not ideology,
but the silence which hides it."23
Critical Legal Studies views legal reasoning as an attempt to reconcile
people to the status quo by making them believe that when judges make
decisions, they do not take sides in the daily struggles of political and
social life. In response to the belief in adjudication as an objective and
rational way to determine our governing rules and institutions, CLS
proposes that legal reasoning is a way of "simultaneously articulating and
masking political and moral commitment." 24 The intricate manner in
which traditional legal reasoning attempts to hide its politics becomes the
main object of the CLS critique.
Under the influence of post-structuralist philosophy and literary theory
as well as recent reconceptualizations of pragmatism in American
philosophy, the "irrationalists" within CLS have extended their critique
of societal power relations to encompass most accepted notions of reason.
Rationality, especially as embodied in legal reasoning is presented as
being used to provide an assailable moral foundation for existing social
relations by "freezing" structures of meaning and closing off the
possibility of all further questioning or debate. For the irrationalists, the
attempt to establish the validity of certain claims to rationality represents
a quest for "objective truth" which is used to obscure the role played by
linguistic and political practices in the constitution of social life. This
quest, by suggesting that the truth "exists" naturally to be discovered by
processes of reason, thus is regarded by CLS as a denial of the world as
something that is created rather than given.
The effect of this critique is to deny that in legal interpretation there
can be any appeal to objective standards of reason or even to the
historicist claim to reason within a given tradition. For the irrationalist,
the struggles between competing claims and legal decisions ultimately are
based on the triumph of one of those positions. Interpretation seems to
become an issue of sheer power.
By denying the project of the search for "objective truth", the CLS
irrationalists hope to illuminate the infinite plurality of ways of
interpreting and living in the world. Critique becomes a process of
developing an awareness of the ideological character of the "reified
structural determinants" found in legal language and institutions and in
23. A. Hutchinson, "Cultural Construction or Historical Deconstruction" (Book Review)
(1984), 94 Yale L. J. 209 at 234.
24. Singer, supra, note 5 at 6.
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the process the contingency of all social events is revealed. The
irrationalist critic does not see contingency and the absence of a rational
founding for action as debilitating. If anything, this situation is accepted
as liberating. "By understanding both social and conceptual authoritar-
ianism, this absence provides a momentary opening for other ways of
being and other forms of life."'25 Accordingly, both social theory and
critical legal theory have meaning only in so far as they reflect and help
illuminate daily political struggles.
Just as in the debate in contemporary philosophy, the participants in
the debate over legal interpretation appear to be caught in the dilemma
posed by Bernstein's "Cartesian Anxiety": "either objectivism or
relativism,... either neutral standards of rationality or the irrationality of
the will to power. '26 Yet this dilemma is by no means inevitable. As will
be clear from an analysis of more recent critical legal theory, the rejection
of rational foundations does not necessarily lead to political and moral
chaos.
III. Joseph Singer and the Movement Beyond Objectivism and
Relativism
One of the clearest and most sophisticated accounts of an alternative role
for legal theory is found in the recent work of Joseph Singer.27 As a
former student of Duncan Kennedy, Singer identifies himself with
irrationalist or modernist tendency within CLS. Yet unlike many other
representatives of this group, which is becoming increasingly dominant
within CLS,28 he denies neither the importance of a positive program of
reconstruction nor the need for defining a continuing role for "legal
reason". Singer can maintain this commitment because he wants to
define a more circumscribed role for political and legal theory which
rejects an appeal either to objective knowledge or to the arbitrary choice
of moral and political values. Basing his work on a combination of
continental philosophy and American pragmatism as exemplified in the
work of Richard Rorty, Singer suggests that it is necessary to give up any
foundational conception of theory as a rational method that is capable of
telling us what to believe and how we are to live.29
25. J. Boyle, "Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Unger's Passion" (Book Review), (1985), 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1066 at 1077.
26. D. Cornell, "Talking Hegel Seriously: Reflections on Beyond Objectivism and Relativism"
(Book Review), (1985), 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 139 at 142.
27. Singer, supra, note 5 and J. Singer, "Radical Moderation: (Book Review), (1985), Amer.
B. Found. Res. J. 329.
28. See M. Tushnet, "Critical Legal Studies: Its Origins and Underpinnings" (1987), 36 J. Leg
Educ. 508.
29. Singer, supra, note 5 at 53.
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However, before outlining a framework for his alternative conception
of theory, Singer develops a brief critique of existing modes of legal
reasoning within liberal legal culture. Following the dominant line of
CLS criticism, Singer contends that legal reasoning and liberal theory are
neither determinate nor objective3 According to his analysis the
traditional assumptions with respect to the determinacy and objectivity of
legal rules are based on a search for certainty within theory which must
now be abandoned. The possibility of determining some rational
foundation which would compel a correct institutional or value choice is
rejected as a fallacy.
According to Singer's "radical pragmatism", law or legal theory is
indeterminate. The meaning of this claim; however, may be expressed in
two different ways: Law is "infinitely manipulable" 31 or legal theories can
be used "to justify very different sorts of institutions and very different
rules. ' 32 A common factor in these definitions is the existence of an
element of choice. Singer suggests that theories or rules are thought to be
determinate if they "tell us what to do" while leaving little or no room for
choice.33 Rather than constraining choice, legal theory or rules actually
compel it. At the heart of the CLS critique of the indeterminacy of law
is a belief that ultimately legal rules are little more than the products of
contingent political and moral value choices. The subterfuge to which
liberal legal reasoning resorts to obfuscate this element of choice becomes
the main object of the recent critique.
According to Singer, both determinacy and indeterminacy are
necessary elements in a coherent liberal legal discourse. In his view, an
appeal to determinate rules and arguments is crucial for sustaining the
ideology of the rule of law because it is necessary for restraining arbitrary
judicial power.34 However, the mechanical rigidity of a completely
determinate set of rules also is undesirable because flexible standards are
believed to be necessary in order to promote just results in specific
situations.35 Liberal legal theory and legal rules thus have to try to
incorporate elements of both determinacy and indeterminacy in a proper
mix. Singer concludes that such a mix of rigid rules and flexible standards
is impossible to attain since despite all attempts to the contrary, legal rules
do not succeed in removing the necessary elements of choice. He also
argues that a determinate legal theory or set of rules must meet four
30. Singer, supra, note 5 at 8.
31. Singer, supra, note 5 at 10.
32. Singer, supra, note 5 at 24.
33. Singer, supra, note 5 at 11.
34. Singer, supra note 5 at 12.
35. Singer, supra note 5 at 13.
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criteria: They must be comprehensive, consistent, directive and self
revising.36 Since current law does not succeed in meeting any of these
criteria, any claims to determinacy must be dismissed as unrealistic. 37
While Singer's "deconstruction" of liberal claims with respect to the
determinacy of legal rules represents an important elaboration on the
CLS critique of "liberal legalism", it is his critique of objectivity in legal
thought which is most relevant to his attempt to develop an alternative
theoretical basis for critical legal thought. According to Singer, the
purpose of objectivism is to establish standards through rational
argumentation that are capable of serving as guidelines for our actions
and for the establishment of social institutions. Singer, however, contends
that this project necessarily must fail because guidance can only come
through reflection on experience and through contextualized conversa-
tions about political and moral values.
Singer suggests that the project of grounding the legal system on a
rational foundation may be based on either substantive or procedural
theories of justification. Substantive theories such as positivism and
natural law claim that the objectivity of legal rules is based on how
accurately they reflect some external source.38 They share a belief in the
possibility of the achievement of rational consensus that will tell us how
to make decisions with respect to moral and legal questions.39 Singer
rejects the underlying assumptions of this position because he claims that
the effect of the belief in the existence of right rules and of the possibility
of their discovery is to substitute the passive preoccupation of rules for
active more choice.40
A similar concern is reflected in his analysis of procedural theories of
justification. Procedural theories locate the objectivity of legal rules in the
employment of proper decision procedures rather than in the accurate
representation of existing correct rules: "The right method yields the
correct rule."' 41 Accordingly, a decision procedure, capable of analyzing
all relevant factors and of generating results from that analysis is viewed
as the primary prerequisite for the justification of law. According to
Singer, this procedural objectivity presupposes the prior existence of
intersubjective agreement not about particular substantive outcomes
36. Singer, supra note 5 at 14-19.
37. See J. Stick: "Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?" (1986) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332.
In this excellent article, Stick claims that Singer's criteria for determinacy, submit legal
discourse to an "unreasonably rigid notion or rationality. According to Stick, no contemporary
liberal legal theory would make such claims with respect to the determinacy of legal rules.
38. Singer, supra note 5 at 26.
39. Singer, supra, note 5 at 28.
40. Bernstein, supra, note 4 at 29.
41. Singer, supra, note 5 at 30.
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(legal rules and standards), but about the method of reaching outcomes
(legal reasoning).42 Following the line of the CLS critique of legal
reasoning, Singer suggests that this notion of social agreement tends to
emphasize vague common commitments and value choices while down-
playing the existence of competing social values. Accordingly this denial
of conflict and a concomitant emphasis on logical technique is regarded
as another attempt to avoid the necessity of moral choice.
According to Singer, the achievement of rational consensus is the
primary decision procedure through which mainstream legal theory
attempts to provide an objective foundation for legal rules.43 However, he
contends that to the extent that it attempts to combine consensus with
criteria of rationality, this project must necessarily fail because it is
internally contradictory. Since liberal theorists (read Rawls) regard
consensus in itself as an insufficient ground for law or politics, reason
must be incorporated into their theoretical framework in order to insure
that the "right" kind of social agreement is reached. Following Michael
Sandel,44 and referring to social contract theory, Singer maintains that
rational consensus can generate neither determinate conclusions nor
decision procedures for generating objective results because it becomes
impossible to determine the priority of either consensus or rational
principle. Since it is impossible to specify "which is the chicken and
which is the egg," he suggests that "it is never clear whether one is
describing what people actually believe or what they should believe if
they thought about it rationally. '45
Throughout his analysis of mainstream legal thought, Singer repeats
the primary reason for his rejection of all attempts to establish an
objective basis for legal rules. According to his analysis, such theories
represent attempts to deny both the element of choice and our ability to
collectively change legal rules and institutions. These specific evaluative
criteria also serve to clarify the object of his critique. He suggests that
without a "meta theory" or some "existing common ground", theory can
not tell us what to do and we are left to make our own choices based on
reflections on our own experience. The alternatives are stark: Either we
appeal to what is local or experiential or we appeal some fixed/
permanent ahistorical standard which may provide solace from our
deepest anxieties. Despite the discussion of the possibility of basing
objectivity in decision procedures, Singer's evaluation of the issue of
rational agreement suggests that he regards rational standards as
42. Singer, supra note 5 at 31.
43. Singer, supra note 5 at 35.
44. See M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice (1983).
45. Singer, supra, note 5 at 38.
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originating only from ahistorical criteria of justification. Accordingly all
standards or evaluative criteria are tarred with the brush of
foundationalism because Singer sees this as the only way to establish
correct standards based on reason. This is revealed clearly when Singer
refers to existing legal reasoning as the "expression fo an innate
antecedently existing decision procedure of rational discourse. '46 By
'defining the objectivism in such a rigid manner, Singer denies the validity
of any process which attempts to validate the truthfulness of our moral
and political value choices. All processes of justification are seen as
attempts to provide a method that will relieve the anxiety of having to
make those choices. He thus rejects this justificatory role for theory and
substitutes in its place an expressive concept of theory which openly
embraces the contingency of all such choices.
IV. Edifying Legal Theory
In place of a systematic theory of justification in legal thought, Singer
suggests a Rortian conception of theory as "edification." 47 According to
Singer's position, legal theory should edify; it should "help... readers, or
society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes,
rather than... provide 'grounding' for the institutions and customs of the
present. ' 48 This suggests a recognition of the need for a continuing active
criticism of the legal system aimed at "broadening the perceived scope of
legitimate institutional alternative." 49 According to Singer, such a process
would also demonstrate the manner in which judges "rationalize" their
discussion by reference to nonexistent "grounds" which are used to hide
from themselves the fact that they are exercising power. "The idea of a
decision procedure allows judge to believe that when they exercise power
they are not really doing so; they are not making choices, but merely
applying the law."50 In this procedure, the belief that "reason" can
adjudicate value conflicts which arise in legal disputes thus reduces moral
judgment to a matter of logical technique which is believed to compel a
particular decision. Singer, however, insists that once edifying theory
reveals that legal decisions are the products of choice and not of necessity,
it then becomes possible to recognize that a wider range of alternative,
political and moral choices are available to us.
46. Singer, supra, note 5 at 51.
47. See R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) at 368-70 for an explanation
of the role of "edification" in philosophy.
48. R. Rorty, id as quoted in J. Singer, supra note 7 at 8.
49. Singer, supra, note 5 at 58.
50. Singer, supra, note 27 at 342.
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In the course of this critique, judicial arguments will be shown to
reflect the contradictory values that pervade society as a whole and the
claim of legal reasoning to embody determinacy, objectivity and
neutrality will be discredited. However, as Singer points out this basic
incoherence of existing legal rules does not necessarily mean that they are
bad. While the critique demonstrates the impossibility of ultimate
foundations of thought grounded in either reason or a rational consensus
in the community, this does not mean that we are left with no criteria for
assessing legal rules and decisions. As Singer suggests, "their goodness or
badness depends on political or moral judgement rather than 'reason'."'51
For Singer the demonstration of the incoherence of legal rules does not
mean that we are left with a void or moral chaos as has been suggested
by traditional legal theorists. He insists that:
we are not destined to live in a world in which we must choose between
believing in some ultimate permanent foundation for law and morality
(rationalism) or believing that all views are as good as all others and it
does not matter what we believe or do (nihilism). 52
Following Bernstein, Singer appears to reject the austere choices
imposed by dichotomous thinking and appears to recognise the need to
avoid the problems associated with both objectivism and relativism. The
rejection of the possibility of rational foundations does not leave us with
the stark alternative of moral chaos: even without a foundation we are
able to develop "passionate commitments and to make our lives
meaningful." 53
Singer does not consider the internally contradictory character of
contemporary legal theory in itself to be a problem. He rejects the claim
that theory is capable of resolving conflicts in the real world.5 4 Legal
theory, according to this position should not be presented as
determinative or constitutive of what we should think or value, but rather
should be regarded as an expression of our competing values. "Legal
theory can not tell us what to value, but it can help us (judges, scholars,
citizens) make choices by helping us to articulate what we value. '55
One of the main characteristics of this theory is Singer's insistence on
the need to carefully locate legal rules within their specific cultural and
historical contexts. For Singer this means that theory cannot simply be
concerned with the form of argumentation and the structure of legal
51. Singer, supra note 5 at 59.
52. Singer, supra, note 5 at 59. This would suggest an absolute disjunction between judgment
and reason.
53. Singer, supra, note 5 at 5.
54. Singer, supra note 5 at 60.
55. Singer, supra note 5 at 63.
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language. Unlike much of the earlier CLS work, he seems to suggest that
it is also important to assess the substantive results of judicial decisions.56
After his assessment of the role of theory, Singer maintains that since all
adjudication involves political and moral decision-making, our evaluative
criteria must be based on our own political and moral values which are
themselves not products of theory. In other words we must decide
whether we can support legal decisions on the basis of our moral and
political judgment.5 7
An application of this legal theory is found in Singer's assessment of
the career of Mr. Justice Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court.58
In this analysis he emphasizes the importance of clearly distinguishing
between judicial activism and judicial passivism.5 9 According to Singer,
am emphasis on a rational decision procedure is an important means by
which the advocates of judicial passivism hide their exercise of political
power. He maintains that a consistent passivism is impossible for the
exercise of power seems to be inherent in the deciding of legal cases. In
any decision, judges are forced to decide in favour of one side or the other
on all matters in dispute. There has to be a detailed weighing of all the
"interests", values, and utilities involved. "Thus the question is not
whether the judge should exercise power or not exercise power, but in
whose interests the power should be exercised. '60
Singer clearly favours judicial activism in part because he believes
there is an "open admission" that adjudication is not so much based on
objective neutral principles but rather upon the more responsive and
pragmatic nature of political and moral values. He praises Mr. Justice
Pashman for his selective activism in which the law-making role of judges
is readily acknowledged61 . As conceived by Mr. Justice Pashman, judicial
activism becomes an important means by which "our legal system
protects the disadvantaged from the powerful. ' 62 This stance meets with
Singer's approval because politically and morally he sees Justice
Pashman's commitment to the protection of the powerless as good in
itself:
According to Justice Pashman, the question is not whether judges should
make law, but whose interests they should protect. He sought to increase
the number and variety of situations in which the legal system would
56. But see K. J. Vandervelde. "The New Property of the nineteenth-Century: The
Development of the modem Concept of Property" (1980), 30 Buff. L. Rev. 325 at 326.
57. See Singer, supra, note 51 and accompanying text.
58. J. Singer, "Catcher in the Rye Jurisprudence" (1985), 35 Rutgers L. Rev. 276.
59. Id, at 276.
60. Singer, supra, note 58 at 278.
61. Singer, supra, note 58 at 281-84.
62. Singer, supra, note 58 at 283.
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require the community to come to the aid of the weak and disadvantaged
in times of crisis. He also believed that the good society would be more
egalitarian than the one in which we live. He therefore used his power to
redistribute certain social and economic advantages from the priviledged
to the powerless. Was this an abuse of his judicial power? The answer
depends not on abstract homilies about the judicial role, but with whom
we place our sympathies.63
V. The Limits of Edifying Theory
Singer rejects both the possibility of a shared thinking process that would
establish legal reasoning as a single rational procedure and any
conception of a rational consensus or agreement as a foundation for legal
rules which would allow us to believe in the objectivity of legal
reasoning 4 While rejecting rational consensus, Singer does not suggest
that agreement is impossible: it is simply not necessary. Accordingly,
"morality is not a matter of truth or logical demonstration. It is a matter
of conviction based on experience, emotion and conversation. ' 65
Questions of morality and law, therefore cannot be proven to be "true"
or "right". Thus for Singer, our assessment of the "goodness" or
"badness" of specific legal rules ultimately depends upon our political
and moral judgments rather than reason.66 This view suggests an absolute
disjunction between judgment and reason. Defined in such a manner,
legal reasoning is reduced to a context dependent practical political
enterprise which is summed up in the Rortian metaphor of a
''conversation."
Legal reasoning, defined as a conversation, reflects the CLS aim of
openness and plurality. Protecting a plurality of discourses is regarded as
a means of preventing historical closure by insuring that alternative
modes of reconceptualizing social relations remain open. The purpose of
legal theory as edification therefore is not to find "objective truth", but to
keep the conversation going67 in order to illuminate ways of thought that
are systematically repressed in the dominant legal discourse. It is this fear
of historical closure which motivates the denial of the possibility of
rational ethical consensus by both Singer and other CLS members. In
place of shared rational communitarian standards, this critique
emphasizes the possibility of an infinite plurality of interpretations.
63. Singer, supra, note 58 at 284.
64. Singer, supra, note 5 at 33-39.
65. Singer, supra, note 5 at 39.
66. See Singer, supra, note 57 and accompanying text.
67. See R. Rorty, supra, note 47 at 377. CLS has clearly been influenced by the
"deconstructive" side of Rorty's thought. However, they tend to neglect the more conservative
implications of his "theoretical" defence of the values and practices of "bourgeois liberalism."
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By concluding that the assessment of specific legal rules ultimately
depends on political and moral judgment, Singer emphasizes the priority
of politics over theory. Accordingly, political choice and action stand on
their own without any need for theoretical justification. Theory is
regarded as being incapable of providing any such justification, since it
cannot specify what our values should be or determine how we shall live.
As Singer makes clear from his own evaluation of "edifying" judges such
as Justice Pashman68 and Judge Garrity,69 the answers to these questions
are political. Posing the problems in these terms, Singer reestablishes yet
another dichotomy at the heart of contemporary critical jurisprudence:
theory v. politics. The attempts to clarify both of these terms in his
thought are equally problematic.
With respect to theory, Singer's problems begin with an overly rigid
conception of traditional legal theory. Singer regards traditional theory as
objectionable because it claims to be able to create or justify legal rules
by providing decision procedures capable of resolving all contradictions
in an objective and politically neutral manner.70 The goal of such theory
is to generate answers through the determination or creation of norms
and values. Such theory, according to Singer, is illegitimate because it
attempts to relieve us of the burden of moral choice.71 He assumes that
the purpose of all forms of traditional theory is to generate answers. By
portraying traditional legal theory in this manner, he reduces justification
to logical deduction from presumably unassailable premises. Few liberal
legal or political theorists actually hold such a view of theory.72
Justification is a much more complex process which is compatible with
key features of critical social and legal theory. Singer, however, has a very
different concept of critical theory in mind.
As specified by Singer, the role of theory is merely expressive.
Accordingly, "legal theory cannot tell us what to value, but it can help us
(judges, scholars, citizens) make choices by helping us to articulate what
we value. '73 Theory thus serves to articulate our political and moral
aspirations rather than attempting to ground specific legal and political
practices. Such a concept of theory is generated by critical self-reflection
on specific concrete problems of living. Fundamental choices are to be
made on the basis of either experience or reflection on social practices. It
would be a mistake, however, to assume that Singer is basing his views
68. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
69. Singer, supra note 5 at 58.
70. Singer, supra note 5 at 60.
71. Singer, supra note 5 at 60.
72. See, Stick, supra, note 37.
73. Singer, supra, note 5 at 63.
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on a reconceptualization of the liberal ideal of autonomous individuality.
Although he emphasizes the active role of the theorist in creating the
theory, he also recognizes the communal nature of theory.74 Here we see
that Singer's earlier rejection of the idea of "rational consensus" is only
partial for he maintains that there remains a "kernel of truth" in this
concept which emphasizes the collective nature of common understand-
ing. Consensus, however, is not something which remains out there
waiting to be discovered, it is something which must be created and
recreated politically in continuous encounter and discourse with others.75
Despite his critical intentions, Singer clearly does not regard his
alternative theory as a fundamental departure from the reality of existing
theory. He simply recognizes what he believes to be the limits of any kind
of theory and then reconceptualizes the role of critical theory to take
account of these limitations. According to his analysis, existing theory
expresses political and moral commitments which are controversial in
themselves rather than meta level principles which are universal in
application and grounded in human rationality.76 What Singer and other
CLS critics decry is not the existence of these commitments, but rather
the attempt to mask them. The articulation of a political vision itself is
embraced as a requisite task of critical legal theory.
While theory as edification continues to inform value choices, Singer
contends that this role is definitely subordinate to politics. Despite the
importance of politics to his theory, its contours remained somewhat
blurred. As envisioned by Singer, politics emphasizes the creation of
intersubjective agreement through radical democratic procedures.
Although this political goal is valuable in itself, as expressed by Singer, it
comes into conflict with two of his theoretical premises: the belief that
political values are inevitably controversial; and the belief that social
agreement must be created rather than found.
Singer never really elaborates on the nature of radical democracy.
Rather he seems to assume that the meaning of the term is self evident.
This assumption is problematic for there is more than one sense of what
we mean by participatory democracy and as soon as an attempt is made
to try to define it, one becomes embroiled in controversy. Singer, who
claims that there is no consensus about the competing moral and political
values underlying legal theory, seems to think that there is more
consensus about conceptions of participatory democracy. He assumes
that all critical legal and social thinkers share common institutions about
74. Singer, supra, note 5 at 64.
75. Singer, supra, note 5 at 64.
76. Singer, supra note 5 at 60.
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radical democracy when in reality the historical practices relating to such
an ideal are conflicting and incompatible.77 The tensions and conflicts
within the framework of a particular political tradition are largely
ignored by Singer. In reality this amounts to an omission of convenience
for if these tensions are recognized, the separation of the expressive role
of theory from that of the rational evaluation of political practices
becomes untenable. The realization that there is no existing consensus
based on shared intuitions should bring with it the acknowledgement that
some appropriate form of argumentation is necessary for evaluating
competing intuitions. The articulation of a political vision cannot be
separated from its justification. The necessary justification, however, does
not have to be based on an appeal to some ahistorical standard. The
central premise of justification thus becomes one of advancing the
strongest historical arguments supporting the historical vision that we
endorse.
Unfortunately Singer fails to realize that some form of justification is
necessary in order to establish the normative authority of his own
position. By suggesting "participatory democracy" as a basis for creating
consensus, he already assumes that there is an existing consensus on the
meaning of participatory democracy. In the very process of trying to
provide a minimal framework for "keeping the conversation going",
Singer unwittingly blocks the road to inquiry by presenting, as
established, a view which depends on competing positions. He thus
precludes the possibility for the development of the very political
processes of consensus creation that are at the heart of his theory. An
appropriate vision of participatory democracy requires a form of theory
which not only articulates its vision but provides standards for the
evaluation of competing ideals. Singer's concept of theory as edification
has yet to allow for the recognition of this more complex process which
relies not just on political judgments but on some conception of rational
criteria of justification.
77. While Singer doesn't explicitly associate his position with democratic socialism, that
tradition seems to be an obvious political reference point for his thought as it is for most
advocates of Critical Legal Studies. However, even if we limit the conceptions of participatory
democracy to the range that would be acceptable within democratic socialist thought we are
confronted with a number of fundamental conflicts.
In an analysis of Marxist political theory which is particularly instructive, Christopher Pierson
suggests that even within Marxism there is little agreement on the nature of the ideal of a
socialist democracy. According to Pierson:
"With the waning of confidence in Marxism, the edifice of socialist theory is now, as
much as ever, a tower of Babel of competing ideologies and strategies."
C. Pierson, Marxist Theory and Democratic Politics (Berkley: University of California
Press, 1986).
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VI. The Politics of Pragmatism
Although Singer intends to provide a self-conscious analysis of the
"nihilist" or "irrationalist" tendency within the CLS Movement, he is
careful to suggest that pragmatism may be a more appropriate label for
his own brand of critical theory.78 To the extent that it focuses on the
formation of a procedural framework for the promotion of democratic
discursive practices, contemporary pragmatism may be seen as a real
alternative to the conceptions of political and legal praxis that prevail in
the work of the first generation of CLS thinkers.79 Yet it is important to
recognize that neo-pragmatism cannot be regarded as a monolithic unity.
Rorty's work is only one variety of contemporary pragmatism. There are
others that may be more appropriate for critical legal analysis. With this
is mind, it is possible to question the adequacy of Singer's theoretical
appropriations.
Singer readily acknowledges that the greatest intellectual influence on
his legal thought has been Richard Rorty's recent revival of the American
tradition of pragmatism. 80 Rorty's work represents one of the most
significant developments in contemporary philosophy. Above all, his
metaphor of "philosophy as a conversation" serves as an important
reminder of the dangers of legal and social theory falling back into a
search for a permanent ahistorical framework to which we can appeal in
order to resolve our epistemological dilemmas. Rorty demonstrates the
necessity of maintaining a continuous and open questioning of social
reality in order to prevent historical closure.
Singer's work also draws attention to another account of pragmatism
as exemplified by the work of Richard Bernstein and the German social
theorist, Jurgen Habermas. Despite sharing a commitment to practical
discourse with Rorty, the Bernsteinian/Habermasian variety of
pragmatism is much more concerned with the relationship between
theory and politics. Accordingly, it represents a more appropriate model
for critical legal theory that focuses more on the politics of law than does
the aestheticized Deweyan pragmatism of Rorty.
78. Singer, supra note 5 at 8.
79. See K. Klare, "Law-Making as Praxis" (1979), 40 Telos 115 and D. Kennedy, "The
Phenomenology of Adjudication" (1987), 36. J. Leg. Educ. 518. Both Klare and Kennedy
derive their concepts of law-making as a form of political reasoning and practice from the
concept of praxis as developed in the early works of Karl Marx. This concept emphasizes social
transformation as a creative project based on the interaction of a collective subject with the
natural world. Despite Marx's recognition of the social aspects of praxis, he fails to account for
the communicative or dialogic nature of transformative action. See K. Marx, The Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (1964).
80. Singer, supra note 5 at 7.
81. See especially R. Rorty, supra, note 47.
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Generally the major advocates of contemporary pragmatism share a
commitment to the promotion of intersubjective dialogue and to political
institutions which embody democratic values. Despite this shared
commitment to democracy, there are important differences in their
attitudes to the role of theory in politics and to the adequacy of the
institutions of liberal democracy which allow us to make judgments
about the utility of pragmatism in critical legal theory.
The main focus of the Rortian project has been relatively narrow.
Until recently, Rorty has developed his work within the limited context
of debates within academic philosophy and literary criticism. His major
concern has been to demonstrate the manner in which philosophy in
general and epistemology in particular has blocked the path of social
inquiry.81 The political dimension of Rortian pragmatism has been
systematically downplayed. This has resulted in a deliberate diminution
of the role of theory in politics.
In his more recent works, Rorty has elaborated on his concept of
"philosophy as a conversation" by strengthening the emphasis on
intersubjectivity. According to this reformulation, it is necessary to
substitute the idea of "unforced agreement" for that of objectivity.82 In
place of the traditional grounding of social consensus or "solidarity" in
ahistorical objective standards, Rorty suggests that objectivity may be
redefined in terms of solidarity as uncoerced intersubjective agreement.
According to Rorty's pragmatism, "the desire for objectivity is not the
desire to escape the limitations of one's community, but simply the desire
for as much intersubjectivity as possible. ' 8 Objectivity is thus defined in
self-referential terms.
With this acceptance of democratic procedures for the formation of
consensus, we get a clearer idea of Rorty's views of the relationship
between philosophy or theory and political practice. According to Rorty,
philosophy's contribution to politics must be procedural rather than
substantive.84 Such procedural theories are supposed to illuminate
specific historical situations and not possess any universal import. More
than anything else, Rorty distrusts the implications of all universalist
theories. This antipathy for universalism contributes to two different but
related conclusions in his theory. It leads him to reject the possibility of
developing a social theoretical perspective on modernity and to question
the validity of establishing a rational grounding for political action.
82. R. Rorty, "Science as Solidarity", unpublished paper. 1986 at 4.
83. R. Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in J. Rajchman and C. West, eds. Post-Analytic
Philosophy (1985) at 5.
84. R. Rorty, "Posties" (Book Review) London Rev. of Books Sept. 3, 1987 at 12.
Critical Legal Theory
Rorty believes that philosophy should no longer be directed at the
construction of grand-scale social theories which attempt to explain the
nature of social life or the possibility of social transformation. Following
the French post-structuralist philosopher, Jean-Francois Lyotard, he
labels such theories as metanarratives which, like Marx's historical
materialism, provide criteria for evaluating and legitimating social action
within specific cultures which are being examined. Rorty is critical of
such metanarratives because he regards them as distractions from the
Deweyan project of dealing with the meaning and problems of daily
life.85
While it is easy to sympathize with Rorty's questioning of the
relevance of the abstraction of grand theorizing, his critique of
universalism is not limited to social theory. He also rejects the rational
justification of political action. He contends that "what we need are
philosophers who are willing to let democratic societies sort things out as
history goes along, without giving them a 'philosophical framework' of
concepts within which to do it."'86 According to this position, it is not
deep thinkers such as Bernstein and Habermas who get things
accomplished politically, but rather superficial dreamers such as Martin
Luther King and Michael Harrington who suggest concrete proposals for
improving society. "They supply local hope not universal knowledge." 87
This entails thinking less about theory and more about social practice.
It is in this opposition of that which is local and concrete to that which
is universal and abstract that the main assumptions behind Rorty's theory
are clarified. Large-scale social theories which attempt to offer general
explanations of social phenomena and critical theory which attempts to
specify universal principles for guiding social and political action are
rejected as being ahistorical and acontextual. At best, according to Rorty,
they are irrelevant to social practice; at worst, whatever the intentions of
their authors, they act as obstacles to further social inquiry. As an
alternative to the ambitions of universalistic theory, Rorty proposes a
more limited theory which is to inform social practice only in specific
localized contexts by suggesting procedures that are relevant to a very
limited time frame. According to Rorty, only such an historically specific
pragmatism is capable of informing concrete social goals. This resort to
concrete social practice has important implications for Rorty's views on
justification.
Although Rorty rejects any appeal to rational criteria for evaluation,
he does not discount the need to provide some form of justification for
85. R. Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Post-Modernity" (1984), 4 Praxis Int'132 at 43.
86. Rorty, supra, note 84 at 12.
87. Rorty, supra, note 84 at 12.
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social action. Believing in the relevance of small-scale, localized action to
remedy certain of the inequities of contemporary society, he recognizes
that there must be some measure of the "appropriateness" of these
actions. He locates this measure in existing social practices.
Rorty rightly insists that social vision of any kind must be worked out
in practice. However, for those interested in democratic political practice,
this amounts to little more than a truism. Without a clarification of the
relevance of specific practices, there is a real danger of falling back into
a type of positivism which reinforces the status quo. Unfortunately Rorty
makes little attempt to provide such a clarification and when he
ultimately does reveal his commitment to the basic values of liberal
democracy, we are forced to question the relevance of his theoretical
views to the construction of a contemporary critical analysis of law and
legal institutions.
Rorty contends that "philosophy should try to express our political
hopes rather than to ground our political practices". 88 Such practices are
regarded as resulting from experimental self-reflection.8 9 Unfortunately,
Rorty seems to assume that we all know what these practices mean and
presents them as a given. In so doing, he neglects important questions
about how we are to discriminate between better or worse forms of
practice; about which social practices need to be discarded and criticized
and which ones need to be reconstructed. 90
Although Rorty's own theory would suggest that these questions are
not unimportant, he neglects them and seems to regard any evaluation
that attempts to distinguish the better from the worse or the rational from
the irrational and is in danger of falling back into a form of
foundationalism.
As an alternative to appealing to a fixed permanent ahistorical
foundation, Rorty posits an appeal to "something relatively 'local and
ethnocentric' - the tradition of a particular community, the consensus of
a particular culture." 91 For Rorty such a particular consensus provides a
standard for justifying a particular position to ourselves - "to the body
of shared belief which determines the reference of the word 'we'. '92 The
tradition or consensus to which Rorty appeals is found in the existing
88. R. Rorty, "Form Logic to Language to Play" (1986), Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association at 752-53.
89. Id
90. R. Bernstein, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward" (1987), 15. Pol. Theory 538 at
549.
91. R. Rorty, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy" in R. Vaughan ed. The Virginia
Statute of Religious Freedom Two Hundred Years After (1988) as quoted in R. Bernstein
supra note 90 at 549.
92. Id
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liberal democracies of North America and Western Europe. This support,
however qualified it may be, for liberal society distinguishes Rorty's neo-
pragmatism from more radical variants that are influenced both by
Marxism and continental social thought.
Over the last five years, Rorty has consistently defended what he refers
to as "post-modernist bourgeois liberalism." 93 By promoting "post-
modernist bourgeois liberalism", Rorty implicitly suggests that it is
possible to separate the post-modernist critique of philosophy from the
contemporary deconstructionist critique of liberal reformist political
thought. In this way, he has been able to support the "extremism" of post-
modernist philosophy while maintaining a loyalty to the institutions of
liberalism which he believes remain capable of providing the necessary
institutional protection for continuing the "conversation of the west."
Rorty presents liberal democracy as a given which does not require
any philosophical presuppositions. Accordingly, theory is required to do
little more than to articulate the common intuitions, settled habits and
shared beliefs of the members of the community who are committed to
liberal democracy. Yet with more than one sense of what is meant by
liberal democracy, it becomes necessary to establish some criteria for
choosing one or another of these competing views.94 It thus becomes
impossible to separate the articulation of a particular liberal democratic
vision from its justification in terms of a specific historical context.
In order to answer some of his critics, Rorty has attempted to clarify
his political position. He concedes that his use of the label "post-
modernist bourgeois liberalism" may have been unfortunate because it is
misleading.95 He maintains that his commitment to liberal democracy is
not an absolute one based on rational evaluative criteria such as the
suggestion that liberal institutions are a necessary pre-condition for self-
creation. Instead Rorty defines his position negatively in reaction to the
authoritarian excesses of existing Marxist socialist regimes. In a manner,
reminiscent of Cold War liberals from the 1950's, Rorty thus suggests
that while flawed, the institutions of liberalism are "humanity's most
precious achievement" and must be preserved in order to prevent the
realization of an Orwellian future dominated by socialist imperialism. 96 It
is in this view of liberal democracy that Rorty also clarifies his position
on justification. Accordingly, the chief attributes of liberal democracy are
toleration, free inquiry, and the quest for undistorted communication.
Justification takes place not by an appeal to rational criteria, but rather
93. See especially R. Rorty, "Post-Modernist Bourgeois Liberalism" (1983), 80 J. of Phil. 583.
94. Bernstein, supra, note 90 at 546.
95. R. Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein" (1987), 15 Pol. Theory 564 at 564.
96. Id at 565-7.
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through a comparison between societies which exhibit the above
attributes and those that do not. Political choices are made by "reference
to various detailed practical advantages. '97 Rorty continues to resist the
idea of theoretical justification. He contends that truth and rationality
"consist of descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification used by
a given society.9 With this concession to existing social practices, Rorty's
theory is once again deprived of any emancipatory content.
Rorty's theoretical inquiries lead academic philosophy into the world
of politics and culture, but his own engagement in this world is strictly
confined. His dismissal of the demand for universalization on either a
substantive or procedural level and his unwillingness to adopt insights
from social theory leave little room for a critique of liberal democracy.
From a Rortian perspective, it seems that the best that we can hope for
is routine reform. In effect, Rorty hypostatizes the present by immunizing
it from all theoretical critique. Philosophy and theory are reduced to
private pursuits while politics, to avoid the extremes of totalitarianism, is
reduced to routine changes within specific institutional settings.99
Richard Rorty's brand of neo-pragmatism is very much dependent on
the existing state of liberal democracies for its social vision. To the extent
that they combine pragmatism with critical social theory, the theories of
Richard Bernstein and Jurgen Habermas are quite different. With the
latter theorists, the concern for radical democracy that characterizes
pragmatism is combined with the critique of domination that forms an
integral element of critical theory. Whether this results in the
development of a comprehensive theory of modernity as it does with
Habermas or an examination of a revised concept of practical reason as
in Bernstein's work, it enables us to look beyond existing democracies to
consider an emancipated future.
Unlike Rorty, Bernstein and especially Habermas are more interested
in the development of a broader social theoretical perspective that
examines the political meaning of social phenomena. Under the influence
of Max Weber and an older generation of critical theorists, Habermas has
recently developed an explanation of contemporary forms of domination
within the framework of a comprehensive theory of rationality. 100
Underlying this broad analysis of contemporary society is a social vision
of a just society in which social decisions are formulated through
97. Rorty, supra, note 83 at 11-12.
98. Rorty, supra, note 83 at 5.
99. R. Comay, "Interrupting the Conversation: Notes on Rorty" (1986), 69 Telos 119 at 127.
100. For the most elaborate development of this theory, see J. Habermas, Theory of
Communicative Action Vol. 1 (1984), Vol. 2 (1987): and J. Habermas, The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity (1987).
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democratic rational normative discourse. This social vision puts a strong
emphasis on democratic institutions which Habermas regards as central
to socialism. Social life is to be regulated through radical democracy and
the institutionalization of democratic procedures. This democratic social
vision also informs a radical and pragmatic view of justification by
providing a procedural standard for rationally evaluating the validity of
all social decisions and action.
A brief examination of Bernstein's work will be useful for clarifying
this concept of justification. 1 1 One of the primary concerns of both
Bernstein and Habermas is with the status of praxis in the contemporary
world. Bernstein believes that it is necessary to redeem a concept of
practical reason that is capable of enhancing our understanding of
rational standards for informing political praxis. 102 Following Habermas,
Bernstein wants to preserve the possibility of critique by establishing such
standards to serve as a normative "grounding" for a critical theory of
society.
Although Bernstein accepts Rorty's argument that there are no
permanent standards, criteria or decision procedures to which we can
appeal, he suggests that we are absolved, neither from the responsibility
of clarifying the issues involved in important debates nor from the
responsibility of distinguishing the worse from the better argument. For
Bernstein, this is not a question of arbitrarily choosing one set of values
over another, but rather of "trying to give the strongest 'historical reasons'
to support one side or the other."103
Against Rorty, Bernstein argues that an appeal to an historically
situated social and political practice as the source of all epistemological
and moral justifications remains incomplete and cannot provide the basis
for theory as critique. Critically assessing which social practices are
relevant and which should be rejected or modified, "is not a matter of
'mere' rhetoric or 'arbitrary' decision, but requires argumentation." 1°4
Rorty's appeal to the experimental self-reflection involved in existing
social practice is not enough. This is seen as merely another strategy of
avoidance to delay the clarification of the "historical" standards and
101. Although Bernstein's work may be distinguished from that of Habermas by virtue of its
author's stronger commitment to American pragmatism, it provides a less obscure and more
self-conscious explanation of the assumptions which inform pragmatic social theory. A
discussion of the major differences between these two theorists is beyond the scope of this
essay. For such a discussion see D. Misgeld, "Modernity, Democracy and Social Engineering"
(1988), 7 Praxis Int'l 268.
102. Bernstein, supra, note 4 at 190.
103. R. Bernstein, "Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind" (Book Review) (1980), 33
Rev. of Metaphysics 745 at 770-1.
104. Id, at 774.
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criteria that must be utilized in the evaluation of political
experimentation.
Bernstein and Habermas substitute a concept of rationality
characterized by "argumentation" and "rational persuasion" for the
open-endedness of Rortian conversation. They believe that only such a
reconstructed practical rationality is capable of providing non-permanent
criteria for evaluating competing social and political practices and
competing interpretations of the world. The most important feature of
this concept of rationality is its emphasis on the importance of a
dialogical basis for reaching intersubjective agreement in which all
participants in the conversation are oriented to "mutual reciprocal
understanding". 105 Within this concept of dialogic or communicative
rationality, practical discourse in which all participate serves as a basis for
determining the norms and values of a system and for making decisions
about its operation. According to this theory of communicative
rationality, the consensual generation of social norms becomes the central
criterion of their validity. 06 This conception of freely formulated
consensus thus not only serves as a basis for justifying specific social
action, but is also used to establish a normative "foundation" for a critical
theory of society.
The themes of "democratic discursive practices", "symmetrical
reciprocity" and "freedom for all" that underly communicative
rationality are implicitly critical of existing social conditions. According
to Bernstein, "non-distorted, reciprocal communication cannot exist
unless we realize and initiate the material social conditions that are
required for mutual communication."' 07 With Habermas, Bernstein
recognizes that our shared ethical life has been corrupted and that our
communication has been distorted by prevalent forms of domination.
Both are concerned with the need to locate and criticize the power
relations that can distort the processes by which standards of judgment
are validated within any given "community of inquirers." Such a critique
must therefore point to the possibility of social situations beyond existing
liberal societies by attempting to specify the preconditions of social
transformation.
Bernstein and Habermas are interested in reviving or redeeming a
concept of moral practical reason that has been silenced by the alienated
105. R. Bernstein, "Introduction" in R. Bernstein, ed.Habermas andModernity at 18.
106. S. Benhabib, "Autonomy, Modernity, and Community" unpublish MS. (1987) Seyla
Benhabib interprets the project of communicative rationality in light of challenges posed by
recent feminist and communtarian theory. My own interpretation of this project has been
informed by this "feminization" of Critical Theory by Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell.
107. Bernstein, supra, note 105 at 11.
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practices of everyday life in contemporary society. They believe that in
dialogic or communicative rationality they have found a procedural
concept that can serve as a regulative ideal capable of informing or
orienting rather than determining action in our practical or political
life.108 Within this conception, the validity of moral norms and the
integrity of moral values can only be established through "a process of
practical argumentation, which allow its participants full equality in
initiating and continuing the debate and suggesting new subject matters
for conversation."' 10 9 Accordingly this concept of rationality has
important implications for critical legal theory for it provides a rational
criterion for assessing competing interpretations which enables us to
avoid both the ahistorical limitations of foundationalism and the
potential positivism of contextual judgment.
VII. Conclusiow
In his attempt to outline an alternative legal theory, Joseph Singer rejects
both the idea of a foundationalist grounding for theory and legal
reasoning and the possibility of a non-foundationalist justification of
political and moral values. 10 While the former position is a crucial step
in the reconstruction of a critical legal or social theory, the latter move
undermines the very possibility of developing this critical project.
Without some evaluative criteria, Singer cannot provide an account for
the normative political judgments that he makes throughout his work. As
such he cannot provide an answer to the Habermasian question: "Why
should domination be resisted?"
Singer suggests that visions of the "good life" or more appropriately of
a "better life than at present" are products of a contextualized
imagination and social practice. This imaginative reconstruction of social
life is also closely related to the faculty of judgement. "Whether some
imagined practice will be better or worse than current practice is a
question of moral judgment."'' While imagination and practice are
conceived of as social activities, the exercise of such judgment continues
to appear as the activities of an individual subject exercising her
autonomous will. Such judgment alone, however, is incapable of
justifying the normative foundations of Singer's rhetoric. The appeal to
political judgment in and of itself does not allow us to distinguish good
judgment from political manipulation. In critical theory, discursive
108. Bernstein, supra note 4 at 162-3.
109. Benhabib, supra, note 106 at 12.
110. See Singer, supra, notes 64 to 76 and accompanying text.
111. Singer, supra, note 5 at 66.
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justificatory mechanisms are needed for validating competing social
visions." 2 Although political visions may be the products of social
imaginations and practices, all such visions are not equally relevant to
political emancipation or social transformation, and communicative
procedures have to be established which will allow their assessment by
the "appropriate" community of inquirers.
In accordance with Singer's own expressed ideal of radical
participatory democracy, a normative concept of reason is needed which
is capable of guiding political debate and informing our judgments about
the preconditions for the realization of a true dialogue between citizens." 3
Contra Singer, rational argumentation does not have to be regarded as a
device for reifying existing structures and categories. Rather discursive
argumentation should be regarded as a critical procedure that provides
the conditions for change and the abandonment of established social
conventions and practices. Without such democratic practical
argumentation, there can be no normative basis for critical legal theory.
112. D. Comell, "Beyond Tragedy and Complacency" (1987), 81 Northwest U. L. Rev. 693
at 706.
113. Id, at 697.
